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Cooperative or investor firms
•Many firms are a hybrid mix of cooperative and 
investor organisation
•Mix changes over time with changes in
• technology
• substitutes, consumer tastes, and 
• capital and labour markets
• The best test of the appropriate organisational 
structure is the survivor of competition, with legal and 
regulatory neutrality
New Zealand Cooperatives 
• Are in many industries including,
• agriculture: dairy, meat processing, fertiliser, irrigation 
• supermarkets, electricity lines
• insurance, finance and banking
• The Cooperative Association reports 55 members about 
half of which are in agriculture
• Are treated as companies very similarly to investor firms, 
except for
• variation in tax treatment of dividends
• variations in company rules that allow coop-structure  
New Zealand Cooperatives
• Arise as solving combinations of:
• contracting for reliable service
• potential market power concerns 
• economies of scale in transactions costs
• having an industry with a collective voice
• Have changed dynamically
• competing with other organisational forms
• with firms switching between cooperative and 
investor organisation. 
• Have a significant presence where there are many 
stakeholders: e.g. agriculture, insurance and 
some forms of banking
Importance of NZ Dairy
• Share of NZ exports
• 1890 7%
• 1920 22%
• 1930 42%
• 2012 25%
• In 2012
•NZ produces 2-3% of world milk supply
•NZ exports 95% of milk produced
•NZ produces a very low share of milk supply in any one 
country, so has negligible market power in world markets 
despite large share of world trade  
NZ Dairy Share of World Trade
Evolution of Dairy Processors
Date Number of
Cooperatives (%)
Export Government
1882 Coops starting
Investor firms
First frozen 
shipment
1920s-50s 220-240  (> 50%) Quality + 
marketing+ price 
control 
1960s-1980s 100=>20 (100%) 1 Exporter (coop) + subsidies
1980s 1 Exporter (coop) De-regulation of
whole economy
2000 4 (100%) 1 Exporter (coop)
2001 3 (100%) competitive De-regulation of 
dairy
2012 3 (50%) competitive Revise regulation
Evolution of Milk Suppliers
Increase in Size and Decrease in Number
2001-2011: 50% increase in size
Whole Economy NZ Deregulation 1980s 
Affected Agriculture:
• Removal of subsidies in 1985 led to 
• immediate reduction in agricultural profitability; recovery 
in the 1990s 
• major change in agricultural product mix 
• major adjustment away from “uneconomic” use of 
inputs
• major enhancement in productivity and quality
• Deregulated agriculture without subsidies 1980s-2012; with 
increasing environmental regulation
• Dairy de-regulation not complete by 2000.
Dairy Issues in 2000
1.The presence of a single-desk exporter: the Dairy Board 
2.The single desk restricted
1. coordination between foreign customers and domestic supply
2. Competition between existing co-ops and potential investor 
entrants
3.Desirable for “workable” competition in 3 Markets
1. in the farm-gate milk market  
2. in the milk products market (which is competitive because 
selling in foreign markets)
3. in the domestic (fresh and confectionery) products market
4.Required removal of the single-desk exporter
Dairy De-regulation 2000/1
Export Markets
2000
Export Markets
2001
Dairy Board
2 co-ops (96% milk) +
2 co-ops (4% milk) 2 co-ops (4% milk)1 co-op (96% milk)Fonterra
Fonterra in 2001
Board Shareholders’ Council
Constitution
•Fair-value share price
14,000 suppliers
Shareholders’ council chooses FVS Valuer 
•Subordinated milk price
•Shares
•only held by suppliers
•1 class of share
•1 share per kg/milk solids
Fonterra 2001 Fair Value Pricing
Milk 
Price
Range of
milk price and capital/share 
value
Board
Dividend
Fair Value Share Price
Valuer Calculation
Gross revenue 
Less operating costs
Less capital costs
Surplus = factory-gate payment for milk only 
Why Regulate in 2001?
• Fonterra with 95% of the farm-gate milk market: 
virtually a monopoly
• Fonterra a monopoly and supplier cooperative: 
• so will not lower the wholesale price of milk to suppliers
• but may overprice the milk to suppliers
• Bundling dividend and milk price may for periods
• Produce a relatively high milk price
• Inhibit legitimate competition
Why Regulate in 2001
Desirable to have workably competitive markets: despite 
Fonterra’s market share
•Regulatory neutrality for competition among coops and 
investor firms
•Test the relative efficiency of firms and organisations; 
including Fonterra
•Allow by competition alternative company strategies to 
emerge if they are economically efficient
Regulation of Fonterra in 2001 
• Given that Fonterra’s constitution provided, “fair value 
share” pricing, the regulations were
Fonterra must 
1. accept seamless entry and exit of suppliers (with 
notification) with their fair value share capital 
2. supply up to 400m litres to other processors if 
demanded
Fonterra is free to set its own milk price
• Regulation in place as long as Fonterra’s market share 
remained high
Regulation produces
workably competitive milk price
•Supplier ability to enter or exit with their capital 
“fairly” priced induced Fonterra to set competitive 
milk price
• Milk price high and share price low: induce excess 
supplier entry (on these terms)
• Milk price low and share price high: induce supplier 
exit
•Aided by cooperative managerial tensions e.g. 
treating suppliers equally throughout New Zealand
Fair Value Share Price Regulation 2001-
2010
NZ Milk Production Grew by 25%
There was Entry
2001/2-2009/10
Particularly Entry by Investor Firms
2001/2 - 2009/10
Fonterra and Other Firms’ Milk Processing 
Volume Grew: Fonterra Lost market Share
(2002-2009/10)
What about NZ Consumers 2000-2011?
Domestic Fresh Milk Price vs Export Price
The Farm Suppliers’ Milk Price
Indices of export and Supplier Milk 
Price 2000-2011
2007 – 2012 Features
• Fonterra introduced milk product auctions in 
2008
– Frequency, contracts and product coverage 
develop to 2012
– Prices used in valuing the Fair Value Share
• NZ Stock Exchange introduces dairy futures 
2011
• Fonterra performance was mixed: 
– low retained earnings
– Some improvement in efficiency
– Grew, but with reduced market share
Fonterra Concerns 2007 - 2012
• Share redemption risk because suppliers have the 
right to leave with the fair value of their capital paid out 
– Internal risk: due to annual production fluctuations inducing 
redemption or take up of shares at the FVS price that also 
varied
– External risk: due to other processors/farm activities 
attracting suppliers away from Fonterra
• Milk required to on-sell to other processors:
– Amount was expanded to 600m litres
– Pricing disputes: 
– Amounts transferred to other competing exporters long term
Others’ Concerns 2007 - 2012
• General: that Fonterra had concerns and might 
change its internal processes and Fair Value Share-
pricing; since it was not enforced by regulation
• Investor firms (also consumers): mainly about 
Fonterra milk price setting 
• Lack of development of a milk market 
– to support domestic fresh and confectionery product 
processors and 
– The incentive for the development of a milk market given 
that milk is provided under regulation from Fonterra
Milk (Under regulation) Purchased from 
Fonterra by Other Processors
2004/5-2009/10
Fonterra solutions 
2007 - 2012
• 2007 Fonterra rejected a manufacturing/marketing 
subsidiary joint with minority investors
• 2010-12 Developed Trading among Farmers: TAF
– Retains vertically integrated cooperative structure and 
control
– Changes the form of redemption risk: 
• Fonterra not required to buy supplier shares 
• Departing suppliers sell their shares in a market
– Links shares to investor traded instruments to provide
• Liquidity in shares
• Superior (independent) value of shares
• Another source of capital
Fonterra changed in 2010 
Board
2010
suppliers
Fixed the share price 
pending the next phase of 
corporate restructuring
Compulsory
Voting Shares (VS)
1kg MS =1 share
Voluntary 
Non Voting 
Dry Shares ≤ 20% VS
Means tradable subject to restrictions
Fonterra
(Shareholders’ Council retained)
Board
2012-13! Trading Among Farmers
suppliers
Purpose
• Determine the share price and trade shares in 
a competitive (asset) market 
• Fonterra no longer must redeem supplier 
capital
• Ancillary effect: provides an additional 
Issues
• Trades among only suppliers will not produce 
liquidity or r asonable share price
• Need c edible process for setting the milk price 
at competitive level to get public confidence 
and reasonable (FV) pricing of units (=shares) 
Pres nt situation
Legislat on in place fo  TAF
• In lu es Commerc  Commission inspection 
of milk price
• If TAF fails r turn to the previous regulation
• Fo terra preparing t  start TAF
Compulsory            Plus option of
Voting Share (VS) additional
1kg MS =1 share      20% shares
Shareholders’
Market
Exchange for 
Trades among 
suppliers
Units held 
& traded 
by the 
public
source of capital • Liquidity and reasonable price would maintain 
open entry and exit of suppliers 
Shareholders’
Fund
Backs shares 
with (non 
voting) Units 
1:1
Final Comment  
• Cooperative form and investor forms continue to be 
tested by competition in New Zealand dairy
• Under the Dairy Regulation of 2001 
•testing has occurred without regulating the actual 
price of milk: despite an almost monopoly coop.
•This was only possible with the cooperative form
• Cooperative and investor firms are likely to co-exist 
where they have different strategies; but in New 
Zealand dairy we wait and see  
Thank you
and best wishes on your tour 
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